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HUMAN–ROBOT INTERACTION
We may not cooperate with friendly machines
In cooperative games, humans are biased against AI systems even when such systems behave better than our 
human counterparts. This raises a question: should AI systems ever be allowed to conceal their true nature and lie 
to us for our own benefit?
Michael Rovatsos
Among humans, white lies and other types of deceptive behaviour are generally tolerated when they are 
underpinned by good intentions, even if 
they are considered unethical from (at least 
some) moral philosophical standpoints. 
Yet the thought of a machine choosing to 
deceive us deliberately makes us nervous — 
even when we know that they are acting in 
our best interest.
In their new paper1 published in Nature 
Machine Intelligence, Fatimah Ishowo-Oloko 
et al. investigate what happens to  
the efficiency of cooperation when 
machines reveal their non-human nature  
to their human partners. Despite advances 
in human-like robotics2, we are still  
far away from this becoming a real  
concern in robotic systems. However,  
in the area of chatbots like Siri and  
Alexa, and other digital assistants that 
interact with humans in constrained 
‘virtual’ contexts, we are likely to soon be 
able to create digital assistants that could 
pass for humans.
Ishowo-Oloko et al. conducted an 
experiment in which human subjects  
were asked to play an iterated online  
game against both human and AI 
opponents. The authors measured how 
cooperative humans would behave in both 
cases, juxtaposing this distinction against 
another variable — whether the human 
subjects had been told that their opponent 
was human or not. The experimental results 
demonstrate that the propensity of humans 
to cooperate with opponents who they 
assume to be bots is lower than that  
toward human opponents.
Different to previous research in this 
area, where ‘anti-AI prejudice’ has been 
widely documented, the experimental 
set-up in the paper by Ishowo-Oloko et al. 
involves a state-of-the-art reinforcement 
learning algorithm3 that learns to maximize 
cooperation against human opponents 
over time. This creates a more interesting 
situation, where one might reasonably 
expect human subjects to detect the bot’s 
ability to learn to be cooperative (while  
also guarding itself against being exploited), 
and, as a rational response, to cooperate  
with such a non-human ‘benevolently 
rational’ opponent.
The authors demonstrate that even 
in settings where humans and their AI 
counterparts can learn from their past 
interactions, humans do not recover from 
their initial biases against the non-human 
opponents, even though a more efficient 
overall behaviour could be achieved if the 
bots identified as human. More specifically, 
they show that the willingness of humans to 
cooperate early in the game, as well as the 
ability of bots to achieve high cooperation 
throughout the game with a human player, 
are compromised if the human player knows 
the bot’s identity. By contrast, bots are 
able to achieve and maintain high levels of 
cooperation (higher than human associates) 
if the human player believes that they are 
playing against another human.
Ishowo-Oloko et al. view their 
experimental results as evidence for what 
they call a transparency–efficiency tradeoff, 
suggesting that there may be cases in which 
being transparent about the true nature 
of the system might be detrimental to 
achieving optimal benefit.
The study has its limitations. One of  
these is that the experimental scenario 
is based on the academically motivated, 
abstract game of the iterated prisoner’s 
dilemma4, which provides a mathematical 
representation of a small (but hard) moral 
dilemma. The different strategies and 
complex dynamics in this game are well-
understood by economists, mathematicians 
and computer scientists, but it is unclear 
whether the participants understood the 
complexities of the scenario, and were 
capable to interpret and reflect on the 
observed opponent behaviour when making 
their own decisions.
A related point is that taking 
transparency seriously would have implied 
not only informing human participants 
about the AI nature of their opponents, 
but also about their learning capabilities, 
their ability to cooperate when their human 
opponent does and general benevolence — 
that is, that they are not trying to trick or 
exploit the human user.
There are of course a number of ethical 
issues associated with the use of deceit in AI 
systems, a topic that was beyond the scope 
of the paper. The strength of truthfulness 
and honesty as a normative value lies in the 
fact that there is only one truth (in factual 
matters), whereas there are many choices 
as to how we may deceive. The information 
provided to a person in each of these choices 
may substantially (though often subtly) 
influence their behaviour and restrict  
their autonomy.
Respect for human dignity also 
 implies that we allow people to act  
against their own (or anybody else’s)  
best interest. While societies and states 
introduce rules for rewarding or punishing 
behaviours, they generally avoid taking 
individual action choice per se away from 
their citizens.
On a more practical level, transparency 
mitigates against flawed definitions of 
norms and allows for their correction over 
time through individual resistance and 
disobedience. If humans do not have all of 
the information needed to make choices 
in front of them, how could the users of 
such systems monitor and correct, for 
example, the efficiency criteria embedded by 
designers into AI systems?
We are already observing massive  
levels of public distrust in the opaque 
optimization criteria employed by 
online platforms using AI systems — for 
example, commercial search engines and 
recommendation marketplaces. Trusting 
that they would act in their users’ best 
interest by hiding crucial information about 
the AI algorithms they use would seem 
highly imprudent.
That said, useful new ideas for how 
to use variable levels of transparency 
may come out of this type of research. 
The article by Ishowo-Oloko et al. raises 
thought-provoking questions around the 
ethical use of transparency in AI systems, 
and provides an exploratory study into a 
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complex phenomenon, which will hopefully 
lead to further investigation. In the context 
of current controversies around the biases 
of AI systems towards different types of 
humans, it would be interesting to see how 
intelligent algorithms could be used to 
address such biases through appropriate 
interventions, including those that stem 
from human-to-human bias embedded 
in the data used to train many real-world 
algorithms. ❐
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